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Interdependent Privacy (IDP)
Mathias Humbert ∗ and Kévin Huguenin
Synonyms
Collective privacy; group privacy; multi-
party privacy; multi-subject privacy; net-
worked privacy; peer privacy
Definitions
Interdependent privacy (IDP) refers to
the fact that the actions or the data of one
or multiple individuals have privacy im-
plications for other individuals. Interde-
pendent privacy risks usually stem from
the fact that data features multiple indi-
viduals or that data that seemingly in-
volves only certain individuals in fact re-
veals information about other individu-
als (typically because of correlation).
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Background
The term “interdependent privacy” was
coined by Biczók and Chia in 2013,
probably inspired by that of “inter-
dependent security” (see Laszka et al
(2014)). Yet, interdependent privacy
risks and associated solutions have been
studied before that: See Humbert et al
(2020) for a comprehensive survey on
the topic.
The root cause of interdependent
privacy is either that the disclosed data
directly features multiple individu-
als or that the personal attributes of
different individuals, hence the data
associated with them, are correlated.
Correlation is particularly strong when
these individuals are related (e.g.,
friends, family members, coworkers).
Interdependent privacy risks are often
formalized through the notions of ac-
cessibility/visibility and inferrability of
personal information.
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Correlation often indicates a predic-
tive relationship between the personal
attributes of individuals; these relation-
ships can be exploited, by an adversary,
at the expense of the individuals’
privacy. Indeed, by considering the
statistical properties of the relationship
between the data of different individu-
als, the unknown personal attributes of
an individual can be inferred, or, more
generally, the knowledge about such
attributes can be refined, algorithmi-
cally from the data disclosed by other
individuals. Beyond correlation, inter-
dependent privacy risks can also arise
when individuals disclose, intentionally
or not, to third parties the information
related to another individual, which they
were entrusted with. Interdependent
privacy risks materialize for different
types of personal data and information.
For instance:
• The personal attributes of an individ-
ual can be inferred from those of their
contacts (Jia et al 2017) as individu-
als tend to bond with individuals with
whom they share certain characteris-
tics (e.g., gender, age, preferences),
a well-documented phenomenon
known as homophily. Information
about both these personal attributes
and social relationships between indi-
viduals are available on online social
networks. Moreover, users of online
social networks can leak directly
(i.e., without the need for inference)
personal information about their
contacts to third parties, including
other individuals and app/service
providers (Biczók and Chia 2013)
(see User privacy research on online
social networks).
• Multimedia data, such as photos and
videos, create interdependent privacy
risks as they often feature individu-
als other than the individual who cap-
tured them (Such and Criado 2018).
Such content is commonly shared on
online social networks and media (see
User privacy research on online social
networks).
• The location information of an
individual can be inferred from
that of their contacts, especially if
co-location information is avail-
able (Olteanu et al 2017). Sources
of co-location information include
posts (with tags and mentions such
as “with Alice”) made on online
social networks, photos, and IP
addresses (see Location information
(Privacy of) and, more specifically,
Interdependent Location Privacy).
• The genetic material of an individ-
ual is inherited from their parents
and (partially) passed on to their
children. Consequently, the genomic
information of an individual is
correlated with that of their parents
and children, but also, by extension,
with those of their family members at
large. Therefore, this information can
be inferred from the information of
those members. Direct-to-consumer
genetic testing services enable indi-
viduals to obtain their genomic data
(from a biological sample such as
saliva) that they can subsequently up-
load on online platforms for various
purposes, such as helping genomic
research (see Genome privacy).
Standard privacy metrics are used to
quantify privacy interdependent privacy
risks (see Privacy metrics). Finally, data
correlation can partially void the guaran-
tees provided by differential privacy (see
Differential Privacy and, more specifi-
cally, Pufferfish privacy) as it violates
the core underlying assumption of data
independence.
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Theory
Studies on interdependent privacy sce-
narios rely on a number of standard theo-
ries and techniques. Note that these theo-
ries and techniques were not necessarily
introduced in the context of interdepen-
dent privacy.
Statistical Inference
Statistical inference, and more specifi-
cally Bayesian inference, is used in in-
terdependent privacy scenarios to update
the knowledge about some personal at-
tribute, typically of the target individ-
ual, given the observation of other at-
tributes, typically those of other individ-
uals. It exploits the statistical dependen-
cies that exist between the target indi-
vidual’s data and that of their contacts
(e.g., friends, family members, cowork-
ers). Many works on interdependent pri-
vacy risk assessment rely on Bayesian
inference (Jia et al 2017; Humbert et al
2017; Olteanu et al 2017).
Bayesian inference often relies on
probabilistic graphical models (PGMs)
for representing dependencies. Bayesian
networks are used to represent directed
dependencies, i.e, conditional prob-
ability distributions between random
variables (see Fig. 1), whereas Markov
networks are used for undirected de-
pendencies, that is, joint probability
distributions between random variables.
Hidden Markov models (HMMs) are a
special instance of Bayesian networks.
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Fig. 1 Bayesian network used for genome in-
ference in a family tree with two parents and
three children. Source: Humbert et al (2017).
Game Theory
Game theory is used to study the in-
teraction between multiple rational de-
cision makers (referred to as players)
who seek to optimize their utility in sit-
uations where the actions of a player
can affect the utility of other players.
A key concept of game theory is that
of equilibrium (e.g., Nash equilibrium)
that models stable states where, given
other players’ strategies, no player has
an incentive to singlehandedly deviate
from their strategy. As such, game the-
ory is a first-class tool for predicting the
strategy adopted by (rational) individu-
als in interdependent (privacy) scenar-
ios. Many works on interdependent pri-
vacy (but also security) rely on game
theory (Biczók and Chia 2013).
Cryptography and Access
Control
Cryptography is used for building
protection mechanisms in interde-
pendent privacy scenarios, e.g., in
case of sharing conflict on co-owned
data, by requiring the consent of all
co-owners before sharing this data or
by hiding parts of the data. For this
purpose, secret-sharing techniques are
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particularly well suited. Attribute-based
encryption and homomorphic encryp-
tion also represent helpful tools for
designing cryptographic solutions in
the context of interdependent privacy.
We refer the reader to Secret Sharing
Schemes, Attribute based encryption,
and Homomorphic Encryption for more
detail.
Access-control techniques are partic-
ularly useful in interdependent privacy
scenarios as they help determine the
audience of co-owned data (typically
shared online) by granting or deny-
ing access to the data. For instance,
relationship-based access control (Re-
BAC) can be used in the context of
online social networks where social re-
lationship information is available. Such
schemes improve on Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) by adding granularity
and context in the definition of roles.
We refer the reader to Access Control




(CPM) theory models how individuals
disclose personal information to others,
building on the metaphor of bound-
aries that determine one’s openness or
closedness to the public. CPM theory is
based on five key principles: ownership,
control, rules, co-ownership, and bound-
ary turbulence. Personal information
belongs to a specific individual, referred
to as the owner, who has right to control
the information. When the owner shares
personal information with another
individual (a co-owner), collective
boundaries are created. Privacy rules are
then defined to coordinate the collective
boundaries of co-owners. These rules
control who can access the information
and determine the possibility of extend-
ing the set of co-owners (linkage rules),
the degree of access to the information
(permeability rules), and the implication
of co-owners in definitions of rules
(ownership rules). The last principles,
boundary turbulences, is related to
scenarios when a co-owner discloses the
information outside the initially defined
boundaries, either intentionally or by
mistake; this concept is particularly
relevant for interdependent privacy sce-
narios. Several works on interdependent
privacy rely on communication privacy
management theory.
Open Problems and Future
Directions
Interdependent privacy has been
studied by different communities
(including information security and
privacy, data science, human-computer
interaction/computer-supported cooper-
ative work, and information systems),
mostly in isolation. One of the reasons
for this is that these different com-
munities refer to the same concept
using different terminologies, such as
interdependent privacy, multi-party
privacy, and networked privacy. One
key challenge is to make these different
research communities work closer with
each other and collaborate to develop
holistic solutions.
Most of the proposed inference algo-
rithms and solutions are ad-hoc and data
specific. In fact, many existing works
focus on photos. Additionally, only a
few works consider service providers as
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a potential adversary: they focus only
on protecting individuals’ privacy with
respect to other individuals. Overall,
none of the existing solutions is generic
enough to handle various data types
and adversaries. Finally, interdependent
privacy should also be tackled from
a legal perspective, in the light of the
various data protection laws across the
world.
Cross-References
Access Control Policies, Models, and
Mechanisms; Role-Based Access Con-
trol; Secret Sharing Schemes; Attribute
based encryption; Location information
(Privacy of); Genome privacy; Homo-
morphic Encryption; Privacy metrics;
Differential Privacy; Pufferfish privacy;
The Economics of Privacy; Interdepen-
dent Location Privacy; User privacy
research on online social networks.
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